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Note 
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT: 
REPROACHING THE SLIDING SCALE APPROACH FOR 
THE FIXABLE FAULT OF SLIDING TOO FAR 
JOHN V. FELICCIA 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,1 the Supreme Court of 
the United States considered whether California courts appropriately exer-
cised personal jurisdiction2 over a nonresident defendant.3  The minimum 
contacts doctrine4 permits a court to assert personal jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants with respect to claims “aris[ing] out of” or “related to” 
the defendant’s activities in the forum state.5  When a court exercises per-
sonal jurisdiction so grounded, it is said to be exercising “specific jurisdic-
tion.”6  The California courts asserted specific jurisdiction over claims 
brought by nonresident plaintiffs for out-of-state injuries arising out of the 
defendant’s conduct that occurred entirely outside California.7  The nonres-
idents’ claims were allegedly connected with California because the de-
fendant engaged in a nationwide course of similar conduct, giving rise to 
claims brought by California residents that were materially identical to the 
claims brought by the nonresidents.8  The Supreme Court held that Califor-
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 1.  137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 2.  A court without personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot render a binding judgment 
against them.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 3.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1779. 
 4.  Under the minimum contacts doctrine, a court may assert personal jurisdiction over a de-
fendant that makes minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit in the 
forum is not unreasonable.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 5.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (“When a 
controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s contacts with the forum . . . a ‘relationship 
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ is the essential foundation of in personam ju-
risdiction.” (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977))).  This Note will refer to the 
“arise out of or relate to” requirement and the “relatedness” requirement interchangeably. 
 6.  Id. at 414 n.8. 
 7.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782 (“The relevant plaintiffs are not California resi-
dents and do not claim to have suffered harm in that State.  In addition . . . all the conduct giving 
rise to the nonresidents’ claims occurred elsewhere.”). 
 8.  See id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The nonresident plaintiffs’ claims] concern 
conduct materially identical to the acts the company took in California . . . which it undertook on a 
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nia’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment9 because a relation-
ship between the defendant and a third party is not enough to connect the 
nonresidents’ claims with the forum.10  A nonresident’s claim remains un-
connected with a forum despite the fact that forum residents bring identical 
claims arising out of the defendant’s substantially similar conduct.11  Even 
when a defendant’s highly coordinated and uniform course of conduct gen-
erates both forum contacts with third parties and the out-of-state conduct 
that gives rise to the nonresident plaintiff’s claim, a connection between the 
claim and the forum is wanting.12 
The Court reached the correct conclusion because the objectives of due 
process are undermined when a court asserts specific jurisdiction over 
claims so tenuously connected with the forum.13  Allowing the relatedness 
requirement to be satisfied by a similarity relationship exploits an expan-
sive, untenable understanding of “relate to” that would upset the “orderly 
administration of the laws.”14  Such an interpretation would grant states the 
authority to adjudicate claims that fail to implicate their sovereign interest.15  
A defendant’s course of conduct that generates separate acts likewise fails 
to implicate a sovereign interest over the whole when only some of those 
acts occur within the forum state’s borders.16  If these kinds of relationships 
were allowed to satisfy the “arise out of or relate to” requirement, the min-
imum contacts doctrine would bring about wildly unpredictable litigation 
for defendants operating on a national scale.17 
Although reaching the correct conclusion, the Court failed to provide 
much guidance as to the “arise out of or relate to” requirement beyond its 
determination that a relationship between the defendant and a third party is 
not enough to connect a claim with a forum.18  After a cursory evaluation, 
                                                          
nationwide basis in all 50 States. . . .  All the plaintiffs—residents and nonresidents alike—allege 
that they were injured by the same essential acts.”). 
 9.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 10.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (majority opinion) (“[A] defendant’s relation-
ship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” (quoting Wal-
den v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014))). 
 11.  See id. (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested 
Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not 
allow the State to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”). 
 12.  See id. (“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum 
and the specific claims at issue.”). 
 13.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 14.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 15.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 16.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 17.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 18.  See infra Section IV.B. 
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the majority admonished the lower courts for adhering to the “sliding scale 
approach,”19 an increasingly popular method for assessing the requisite rela-
tionship between a plaintiff’s claim and the forum.20  Cautioning against the 
use of a sliding scale, the Court observed that the courts below “found that 
specific jurisdiction was present without identifying any adequate link be-
tween the State and the nonresidents’ claims.”21  This lack of a connection, 
however, was a failing of the lower courts’ expansive reading of “relate to,” 
not the sliding scale approach.22  Without substituting an approach of its 
own, the Court left lower courts rudderless in navigating the expanse of 
what constitutes an “adequate link” for the purposes of specific jurisdic-
tion.23  This Note argues that not only does sliding scale remain viable but, 
as a flexible standard, it also best comports with the minimum contacts doc-
trine’s fundamental inquiry—fairness.24 
I.  THE CASE 
On March 12, 2012, plaintiffs from thirty-four different states filed 
eight separate complaints with identical causes of action against Bristol-
Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”) and McKesson Corporation 
(“McKesson”) in the San Francisco Superior Court.25  The complainants 
sought to hold the defendants liable for the harmful side effects of taking 
Plavix,26 a blood clotting inhibitor, which BMS manufactured and 
McKesson distributed.27  The presiding judge of the superior court coordi-
nated the complaints and jointly assigned them to a coordination trial 
judge.28 
                                                          
 19.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (“Our cases 
provide no support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general juris-
diction.”). 
 20.  See infra Section IV.B.  Under the “sliding scale approach,” a weaker connection be-
tween a defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim is permissible if the defendant has 
extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to the claim.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 21.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 22.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 23.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82. 
 24.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 25.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 415–16 (Ct. App. 
2014), aff’d, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 26.  The complaints asserted the same twelve causes of action: strict products liability based 
on design, strict products liability based on manufacturing defect, negligence, breach of implied 
warranty, breach of express warranty, deceit by concealment, negligent misrepresentation, fraud 
by concealment, unfair competition, false or misleading advertising, injunctive relief for false or 
misleading advertising, and loss of consortium.  Id. at 416 n.1.  The complaints were later amend-
ed to include a cause of action for wrongful death.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 
377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 27.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 415–16. 
 28.  Id. at 416. 
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The consolidated cases consisted of 659 individual plaintiffs, 84 of 
whom were California residents.29  BMS filed a consolidated motion to 
quash service to the 575 nonresident plaintiffs, arguing that the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over it by California courts would be improper under 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown30 since BMS was not “at 
home” in California.31  BMS also asserted that the nonresident plaintiffs, 
none of whom were prescribed or allegedly injured by Plavix in Califor-
nia,32 could not invoke the specific jurisdiction of California courts because 
their cases did not arise out of or relate to BMS’s contacts with the forum.33 
Although BMS was incorporated under Delaware law and headquar-
tered in New York,34 it drew a sizable amount of revenue from California,35 
was registered with the California Secretary of State,36 operated out of ten 
locations in the state,37 and employed over 500 in-state residents.38  The trial 
court determined that such extensive in-state activity amounted to “wide-
ranging, systematic, and continuous contacts” with California, warranting 
the exercise of general jurisdiction over BMS.39  The trial court accordingly 
denied BMS’s motion to quash service on the nonresident plaintiffs.40 
BMS appealed the trial court’s decision to the California Court of Ap-
peals, which summarily denied the petition for review on January 14, 
2014.41  That same day, however, the Supreme Court of the United States 
rendered its decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman,42 which clarified Good-
year’s “at home” limitation on the exercise of general jurisdiction.43  The 
                                                          
 29.  Id. at 415. 
 30.  564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 31.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 416–17 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
 32.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 879 (Cal. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 33.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 416. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Between 2006 and 2012, BMS sold nearly $1 billion worth of Plavix in California.  Id. at 
417. 
 36.  Since 1936, BMS has maintained its registration to do business in California, which re-
quires the appointment of an in-state agent for service of process.  Id. 
 37.  Five of the locations were offices, four were facilities used primarily for research and 
laboratory activities not involving Plavix, and the final location was used by BMS’s government 
affairs group.  Id. 
 38.  In-state personnel consisted of sales representatives, office employees, and research staff.  
Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 418. 
 42.  134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 43.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A court 
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations . . . when their affiliations with the 
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” 
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945))).  While Goodyear’s “at home” 
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Daimler Court held that “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will 
render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.”44  The Court 
doubled down on Goodyear’s determination that the “paradigm” bases for 
general jurisdiction over a corporation are the place of incorporation and the 
principal place of business.45  Daimler reframed the general jurisdiction in-
quiry as “not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said 
to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’” but, rather, “whether that 
corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” 
as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum state.’”46  The Daimler 
Court reasoned that only in truly exceptional cases will a substantial, con-
tinuous, and systematic course of business, by itself, subject a corporation 
to the general jurisdiction of a court in a state where it neither incorporated 
nor maintains its principal place of business.47 
BMS, relying heavily on Daimler, petitioned the Supreme Court of 
California for further review of the trial court’s order denying their motion 
to quash service.48  The Supreme Court of California granted the petition 
and remanded the case back to the California appellate court for further re-
view in light of Daimler.49  Under the new guidance of Daimler, the court 
of appeals held that the nonresident plaintiffs did not present evidence suf-
ficient to establish that BMS was “at home” in California and overturned 
the trial court’s exercise of general jurisdiction.50  The court failed to dis-
cern any differences between BMS’s activities in California and those of 
the defendant in Daimler, which the United States Supreme Court had held 
insufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction.51 
The court then turned to the principles of specific jurisdiction to find a 
basis for California courts to hear the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.52  To 
exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court needed 
to find (1) that the defendant “purposefully directed” its activities at the fo-
rum state, (2) that the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of or related to those fo-
rum-directed activities, and (3) that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasona-
                                                          
limitation seems straightforward, the opinion did not definitively state that the traditional “contin-
uous and systematic” basis no longer sufficed.  See id. 
 44.  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 761 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
 47.  Id. at 761 n.19.  In those circumstances, general jurisdiction “calls for an appraisal of a 
corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.”  Id. at 762 n.20. 
 48.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 418 (Ct. App. 2014), 
aff’d, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 424. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 425. 
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ble.53  After observing that the United States Supreme Court had not yet de-
fined what it means to “arise out of” or “relate to” a defendant’s contacts 
with a state,54 the court turned to decisions of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia for guidance.55 
In Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.,56 the Supreme Court 
of California adopted a “substantial connection” test, under which the relat-
edness requirement is satisfied if “there is a substantial nexus or connection 
between the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim.”57  Draw-
ing on language in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,58 which contrast-
ed the sufficiency of corporate “presence” incident to a suit arising out of 
continuous and systematic activities with the insufficiency of corporate 
presence incident to a suit unconnected with casual contacts, Vons further 
reasoned that “the intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the 
claim to those contacts are inversely related.”59  Under this “sliding scale 
approach,” a connection between a defendant’s forum contacts and a claim 
is more readily shown as the defendant engages in more wide-ranging con-
tacts with a forum.60 
On this basis, the court of appeals held that BMS’s deliberate exploita-
tion of the California Plavix market and “common effort” marketing Plavix 
to both residents and nonresidents alike created a substantial connection be-
tween BMS’s forum contacts and the nonresidents’ claims.61  The court ob-
served that the sufficiency of that connection was ensured by BMS’s sub-
stantial and continual contacts with California, the presence of dozens of 
resident plaintiffs alleging precisely the same wrongdoing as the nonresi-
dent plaintiffs, the interstate nature of BMS’s business, and BMS’s nation-
wide sales of Plavix.62  Under the sliding scale approach articulated by 
Vons, these considerations in the aggregate made California’s assertion of 
                                                          
 53.  Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). 
 54.  Id. at 429 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not yet further defined the second step of specific 
jurisdiction analysis, that being what it means for a suit to ‘arise out of’ or ‘relate’ to a defendant’s 
contacts with the State.” (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 416 n.10 (1984))). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  926 P.2d 1085 (Cal. 1996). 
 57.  Id. at 1099–100. 
 58.  326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 59.  Vons, 926 P.2d at 1096–97. 
 60.  Id. at 1098–99. 
 61.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 433–34, 439 (Ct. 
App. 2014), aff’d, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 62.  Id. at 435.  In considering the interstate and nationwide nature of BMS’s business, the 
appellate court reasoned that a “necessary incident” to operations of such a character is “the fore-
seeable circumstance of causing injury to persons in distant forums.”  Id. at 434 (quoting Cornel-
ison v. Chaney, 545 P.2d 264, 269 (Cal. 1976) (en banc)). 
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specific jurisdiction over BMS with respect to the nonresidents’ claims 
comport with the “traditional conception of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.”63  After finding that BMS had not met its burden to show the unrea-
sonableness of jurisdiction, the court of appeals denied BMS’s petition for 
review.64 
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the appel-
late court’s ruling.65  Honing in on the strength of the connection between 
BMS’s forum contacts and the nonresidents’ claims by reason of BMS’s na-
tionwide marketing of Plavix, the court did away with appellant arguments 
that the relatedness test failed due to the nonresidents’ claims being “paral-
lel” and failing to “intersect” with the residents’ claims.66  The court rea-
soned that this was not a case of mere “parallel” claims because the claims 
brought by the resident and nonresident plaintiffs arose out of “a single, co-
ordinated, nationwide course of conduct.”67  The court also restated the slid-
ing scale approach to specific jurisdiction established by Vons and observed 
that BMS’s extensive activity in California allowed for the relatedness re-
quirement to be met with a less direct connection than might otherwise be 
required in the absence of such activity.68  Granted this low threshold for 
relatedness, the court found that “BMS’s nationwide marketing, promotion, 
and distribution of Plavix created a substantial nexus between the nonresi-
dent plaintiffs’ claims and the company’s contacts in California concerning 
Plavix.”69 
Justice Werdegar dissented, accusing the majority of “reducing relat-
edness to mere similarity and joinder.”70  Although BMS’s similar conduct 
gave rise to similar claims brought by forum residents, Justice Werdegar 
could discern no further relationship between the nonresidents’ claims and 
BMS’s California contacts.71  Justice Werdegar reasoned that California’s 
legitimate interest in regulating conduct within its borders had not been im-
plicated because BMS’s California contacts failed to “intersect” with the 
nonresidents’ claims.72  In Justice Werdegar’s view, the nonresident plain-
                                                          
 63.  Id. at 435–36. 
 64.  Id. at 436–40. 
 65.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 66.  Id. at 888. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 889. 
 69.  Id. at 888. 
 70.  Id. at 896 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
 71.  Id. at 898 (“In each state, the company’s activities are connected to claims by those who 
obtained Plavix or were injured in that state, but no relationship other than similarity runs between 
the claims made in different states.”). 
 72.  Id. at 898–900. 
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tiffs’ claims arose solely out of BMS’s conduct in other states and did not 
implicate California’s sovereign interest by virtue of a mere resemblance to 
claims brought by residents.73  Unable to identify a substantial nexus con-
necting BMS’s California contacts with the nonresidents’ claims, Justice 
Werdegar warned that the majority’s decision “impairs important functions 
of reciprocity, predictability, and limited state sovereignty served by the re-
latedness requirement.”74 
BMS filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of 
the United States.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether 
the California courts’ exercise of jurisdiction violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
When a court seeks to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant, the power to do so is constrained by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.76  To satisfy due process, a nonresident de-
fendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”77  Unless a defendant corporation is amenable to gen-
eral jurisdiction in the forum state, the minimum contacts doctrine addition-
ally requires that the claim “arise out of or relate to” the corporation’s fo-
rum contacts.78  While the Court has refined the minimum contacts doctrine 
significantly over the years, it has provided shockingly little guidance with 
respect to the “arise out of or relate to” requirement,79 leaving lower courts 
to craft their own definitions.  Section II.A traces the evolution of the Su-
preme Court’s minimum contacts doctrine from its origin in International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington.  Section II.B focuses on the Supreme Court’s 
sparse developments with regard to the “arise out of or relate to” require-
ment.  Finally, Section II.C surveys the state of the law regarding “arise out 
of or relate to” in the federal circuits. 
                                                          
 73.  Id. at 899–900. 
 74.  Id. at 896. 
 75.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017). 
 76.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
 77.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 78.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923–24 (2011). 
 79.  See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 415 n.10 
(1984) (posing several questions regarding the “arise out of or relate to” requirement, but declin-
ing to answer them). 
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A.  The Origin of the Minimum Contacts Doctrine and Later 
Refinements 
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court established the minimum 
contacts doctrine under which courts may secure personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants.80  International Shoe Company, a corporation based 
in Missouri and incorporated in Delaware, was sued by the State of Wash-
ington to compel payment of unemployment tax assessments which had ac-
crued due to its employment of salesmen in the state.81  International Shoe 
contested Washington’s assertion of jurisdiction over it on the grounds that 
it had no offices in the state, it did not make any contracts in the state,82 and 
that it was, therefore, not “present” in the state for the purposes of personal 
jurisdiction.83 
In order for a forum to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant, the Court required “minimum contacts” with the forum state 
“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.’”84  The Court drew a distinction between 
the minimum contacts required to entertain jurisdiction over liabilities aris-
ing out of or related to those contacts and contacts “so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit against [a defendant] on causes of action aris-
ing from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”85  The latter type 
of jurisdiction concerning claims not necessarily arising out of forum con-
tacts became known as “general jurisdiction”86 while the former type of ju-
risdiction concerning claims arising out of contacts with a forum became 
known as “specific jurisdiction.”87 
In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration, the Court required that: (1) the foreign corporation “exercise[] the 
privilege of conducting activities within a state,”88 (2) the litigation “arise 
out of or [be] connected with” those activities,89 and (3) the state’s adjudica-
                                                          
 80.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 81.  Id. at 311–12. 
 82.  Id. at 313–14.  The contracts for purchase of International Shoe’s merchandise were 
formed in Missouri following receipt of customers’ orders that their salesmen solicited in the state.  
Id. 
 83.  Id. at 315–16.  Historically, a defendant’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a 
court was a prerequisite to the court’s rendition of a binding judgment on the defendant.  Id. at 
316. 
 84.  Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 85.  Id. at 318.  
 86.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (citing 
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–44 (1966)). 
 87.  Id. at 414 n.8 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 86, at 1144–64). 
 88.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
 89.  Id. 
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tion of the suit be reasonable under the circumstances.90  The Court rea-
soned, “to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting 
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of 
that state.”91  Granted those benefits, a reciprocal requirement for the corpo-
ration to defend against suits enforcing “obligations [that] arise out of or are 
connected with the activities within the state . . . can, in most instances, 
hardly be said to be undue.”92  In view of the fact that International Shoe 
had engaged in activities in Washington throughout the years and the obli-
gation sued upon “arose out of those very activities,” the Court held that it 
was “reasonable and just” to allow Washington to enforce that obligation in 
its own courts.93 
1.  Purposeful Availment 
International Shoe’s requirement that a foreign corporation “exercise[] 
the privilege of conducting activities within a state” operates to ensure that 
there is a fair reciprocity between a forum’s enforcement of an obligation 
and the defendant’s activities.94  It was unclear, however, what precise ac-
tions would constitute the exercise of a privilege in a state.  It was not until 
Hanson v. Denckla95 that the Court first articulated the “purposeful avail-
ment” requirement.96  In Hanson, a Florida court sought to assert jurisdic-
tion in probate proceedings over a Delaware corporation that served as the 
decedent’s trustee.97  The decedent had created the trust while living in 
Pennsylvania but had subsequently moved to Florida, where she carried on 
a number of transactions with the corporation concerning the trust.98  The 
Court decided that the unilateral activity of the decedent moving to Florida 
and continuing to do business with the corporation did not constitute an ex-
ercise of a privilege in Florida by the corporation since the corporation did 
not purposefully avail itself of a privilege in the forum.99  The lack of pur-
                                                          
 90.  Id. at 317. 
 91.  Id. at 319. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 320. 
 94.  See id. at 319 (“[The Due Process Clause] does not contemplate that a state may make 
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state 
has no contacts, ties, or relations.”). 
 95.  357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 96.  Id. at 253 (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-
voking the benefits and protections of its laws.”). 
 97.  Id. at 241–42. 
 98.  Id. at 238–40. 
 99.  Id. at 253. 
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poseful Florida contacts by the trustee made the exercise of personal juris-
diction by Florida courts improper.100 
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,101 the Court circum-
scribed the scope of the requirement that a foreign corporation “exercise[] 
the privilege of conducting activities within a state” even further.  In that 
case, an automobile retailer sold a car in New York which was involved in 
an accident in Oklahoma.102  While the retailer did not conduct any business 
whatsoever in Oklahoma,103 the plaintiffs asserted that the foreseeability of 
a buyer driving a car into other states warranted a finding that the retailer 
had exercised a privilege in those states that the car traveled through.104  
The Court reasoned that the foreseeability that is relevant to due process 
analysis is that which emanates from the defendant’s purposeful “conduct 
and connection” with the forum state.105  Foreseeability that a defendant’s 
product will wind up in the foreign state is not, by itself, a sufficient basis 
for a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant.106 
                                                          
 100.  Id. 
 101.  444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 102.  Id. at 288–89. 
 103.  Id. at 289.  The Court noted that the retailer did not ship or sell any of its products to Ok-
lahoma, had no agent to receive process in Oklahoma, and did not purchase any advertisements in 
any media calculated to reach Oklahoma.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 295.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed, finding it “reasonable to infer, given 
the retail value of the automobile, that the [retailer] derive[s] substantial income from automobiles 
which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma.”  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 585 P.2d 351, 354 (Okla. 1978), rev’d, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).   
 105.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 106.  Id. at 295–97.  On this basis, the Court reasoned that a defendant’s delivery of its prod-
ucts “into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers 
in the forum State” is sufficient to establish purposeful contacts.  Id. at 298 (emphasis added).  
This reasoning led to the stream of commerce debate in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), which involved the question of whether a defendant establishes pur-
poseful contacts with a forum state by placing a product in the stream of commerce that eventually 
reaches the forum state.  Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion) (“The placement of a 
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State.”), with id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The stream of com-
merce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of 
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.”), id. (“As long as a participant in this 
process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a 
lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”), and id. (“[B]enefits accrue regardless of whether that 
participant directly conducts business in the forum State, or engages in additional conduct directed 
toward that State.”).  The plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 
873 (2011), disavowed Justice Brennan’s approach but ultimately lacked the majority support 
necessary to settle the debate.  See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion) (“The defendant’s 
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to 
have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted 
that its goods will reach the forum State.”). 
 2018] BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO. V. SUPERIOR COURT 873 
Instead, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court required purposeful con-
duct on the part of a nonresident defendant giving it “clear notice that it is 
subject to suit” in the forum state.107  The Court concluded that such a re-
quirement allows defendants to “structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 
liable to suit.”108  Since the foreseeability of the car being taken to Oklaho-
ma could not be attributed to the retailer’s purposeful “conduct and connec-
tion” with the forum state, the Court found no purposeful “contacts, ties, or 
relations” between the retailer and Oklahoma.109  The Court held that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the retailer by Oklahoma courts was improp-
er.110 
2.  Reasonable Under the Circumstances 
International Shoe also indicated that when a defendant makes pur-
poseful contacts with the forum state, a court must find that “maintenance 
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice’” before the court can make a finding of minimum contacts and 
properly exercise jurisdiction.111  The Court noted that the demands of due 
process are met when a corporation’s contacts make it reasonable “in the 
context of our federal system of government,” to require the corporation to 
defend a suit in a foreign jurisdiction.112  The Court further noted that an 
“estimate of the inconveniences” borne by the nonresident defendant in de-
fending suit away from home is relevant in this connection.113 
While the ultimate determination of fairness in International Shoe was 
assessed in a straightforward appraisal of the defendant’s systematic and 
continuous activities in the state which resulted in a large volume of inter-
state business,114 the Court’s later decision in McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co.115 concerned a single forum contact by the defendant, war-
ranting a closer look at the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction.116  The 
McGee Court recognized a state’s interest in providing effective means of 
redress to its residents when a Texas insurer denied payment for a covered 
loss to a California insured.117  The Court described the “severe disad-
                                                          
 107.  World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295–97. 
 108.  Id. at 297. 
 109.  Id. at 298–99 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
 110.  Id. at 299. 
 111.  326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 112.  Id. at 317. 
 113.  Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
 114.  Id. at 320. 
 115.  355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
 116.  Id. at 222. 
 117.  Id. at 223. 
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vantage” posed to out-of-state plaintiffs that would be forced to litigate in 
Texas and the resultant potential that the Texas insurer may become judg-
ment proof as to those plaintiffs.118  The Court observed, “[w]hen claims 
were small or moderate[,] individual claimants frequently could not afford 
the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum” and ultimately found the 
exercise of jurisdiction by California courts to be in accord with due pro-
cess.119 
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court noted that, while the burden on 
the defendant is “always a primary concern,” reasonableness of jurisdiction 
is to be considered “in light of other relevant factors.”120  The Court sum-
marized the case law implicating the reasonableness of jurisdiction and spe-
cifically recognized a state’s interest in adjudicating a dispute,121 the plain-
tiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,122 the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies,123 and the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.124  In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,125 the 
Court observed, “[t]hese considerations sometimes serve to establish the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts 
than would otherwise be required.”126  The Burger King Court made several 
recommendations for overcoming the unreasonableness that inheres in these 
considerations127 and noted that the defendant must present a “compelling 
case” to defeat jurisdiction based on a sufficient finding of purposeful con-
tacts.128 
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,129 Justice Brennan 
framed his opinion concurring in the judgment with the plurality as the 
                                                          
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 223–24. 
 120.  444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
 121.  Id. (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 223). 
 122.  Id. (citing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)). 
 123.  Id. (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93). 
 124.  Id. (citing Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98).  In Kulko, for example, the Court considered Califor-
nia’s “substantial interests in protecting the welfare of its minor residents and in promoting to the 
fullest extent possible a healthy and supportive family environment in which the children of the 
State are to be raised.”  436 U.S. at 98. 
 125.  471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 126.  Id. at 477. 
 127.  Id.  For example, the Court contended that “the potential clash of the forum’s law with 
the ‘fundamental substantive social policies’ of another State may be accommodated through ap-
plication of the forum’s choice-of-law rules” and that “a defendant claiming substantial inconven-
ience may seek a change of venue.”  Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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“compelling case” Burger King contemplated.130  Although Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion catalogued the unreasonableness of jurisdic-
tion gratuitously after finding that Asahi had made no purposeful contacts 
with the forum state,131 in Justice Brennan’s view, reasonableness consider-
ations decisively upended jurisdiction based on purposeful contacts.132  In 
Asahi, California’s exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese defendant corpo-
ration with respect to a products liability claim would have required the de-
fendant to traverse the Pacific Ocean to defend suit in a legal system very 
different from its own.133  The Court also observed that California’s interest 
in adjudicating the dispute was minimal since the plaintiff was not a Cali-
fornia resident.134  The international context of the case further compounded 
the unreasonableness of jurisdiction by calling into question whether Cali-
fornia’s adjudication of the dispute would be an efficient resolution that ad-
vanced substantive policies.135  The weighty procedural and substantive in-
terests of other nations, along with the foreign relations policies which 
became implicated, ultimately steered the Court’s determination towards a 
finding of unreasonableness.136  The Court held that the California courts’ 
assertion of jurisdiction offended due process.137 
B.  The “Arise out of or Relate to” Requirement 
International Shoe first formulated the “arise out of or relate to” prong 
of the minimum contacts test in slightly different language than that which 
appeared in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.  The International Shoe 
Court explained that, so long as a foreign corporation’s obligations “arise 
out of or are connected with the[ir] activities within the state, a procedure 
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them 
can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.”138  Other parts of the 
opinion discussing the nexus between forum-state activities and the plain-
tiff’s claim use the words “unrelated to,”139 but it was not until Helicopteros 
                                                          
 130.  Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“This is one of those rare cases in which ‘minimum 
requirements inherent in the concept of “fair play and substantial justice” . . . defeat the reasona-
bleness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78)). 
 131.  Id. at 113–14 (plurality opinion) (observing that, even apart from the plurality’s judgment 
that Asahi made no purposeful contacts with the forum, “[a] consideration of these factors in the 
present case clearly reveals the unreasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi”). 
 132.  See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 133.  Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–14. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 115. 
 136.  Id. at 115–16. 
 137.  Id. at 116. 
 138.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis added). 
 139.  Id. at 318, 320. 
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Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,140 that the Court phrased the prong as 
requiring suits to “aris[e] out of or relate[] to” the defendant’s forum activi-
ties.141  Whatever the wording, a connection between the defendant’s con-
tacts with the forum and the plaintiff’s claim is required for a court to assert 
specific jurisdiction.142 
The Supreme Court has rarely discussed the “arise out of or relate to” 
requirement.  In Helicopteros, the relatedness requirement was ripe for dis-
cussion, yet the parties failed to argue and brief it.143  In that case, Helicop-
teros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. (“Helicol”), a helicopter transport 
company based in Colombia, had numerous business contacts with the State 
of Texas.144  Helicol purchased most of its helicopters and accessories from 
a Texas company, sent its pilots to Texas for training, and negotiated a con-
tract in Texas by which it would render transportation services in Peru.145  
While performing under that contract, one of Helicol’s helicopters crashed, 
killing four United States citizens.146  The survivors and representatives of 
the decedents filed wrongful death claims against Helicol in Texas.147 
The claimants conceded that the wrongful death claims did not arise 
out of or relate to Helicol’s Texas contacts and, instead, relying on Perkins 
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,148 argued that Helicol was amenable 
to general jurisdiction in Texas.149  Perkins involved a Philippine mining 
company whose president conducted the entirety of its limited wartime ac-
tivities in Ohio after being forced to abandon the company’s principal place 
of business near the Pacific theater of World War II.150  In that case, the 
Court relied on the mining company’s “sufficiently substantial” forum con-
tacts to permit Ohio courts to exercise jurisdiction over the company with 
respect to a cause of action entirely distinct from the limited wartime activi-
ties it conducted within the State.151  The Helicopteros Court found that 
Helicol’s contacts with Texas did not “constitute the kind of continuous and 
                                                          
 140.  466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 141.  Id. at 414 n.8.  In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the 
Court also employed “relate to” language, though not specifically in the context of the minimum 
contacts doctrine’s relatedness requirement.  See id. at 438. 
 142.  See infra Section II.C. 
 143.  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10. 
 144.  Id. at 410–11. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 409–10. 
 147.  Id. at 412. 
 148.  342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 149.  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415. 
 150.  Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48. 
 151.  Id. 
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systematic general business contacts” found in Perkins and held that Heli-
col was not amenable to the general jurisdiction of Texas courts.152 
The Court’s majority opinion expressed “no ‘view’” with respect to 
the relationship between the plaintiffs’ wrongful death causes of action and 
Helicol’s contacts with Texas because the issue of specific jurisdiction was 
not argued.153  The majority therefore did not confront the potential differ-
ence between “arise out of” and “relate to” and declined to “address the va-
lidity or consequences of such a distinction.”154  In a lone dissent, Justice 
Brennan found the defendant’s Texas contacts to be both sufficiently sub-
stantial, warranting the exercise of general jurisdiction over Helicol,155 and 
sufficiently related to the underlying cause of action, warranting the exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.156  Justice Brennan 
warned that one possible reading of the Court’s opinion seemed to imply 
that Texas courts could not exercise specific jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ 
claims because the cause of action did not formally arise out of Helicol’s 
Texas contacts.157 
While Justice Brennan conceded that the cause of action did not “arise 
out of” Helicol’s specific activities in Texas, he asserted that the cause of 
action did “relate[] to” the defendant’s Texas contacts since the helicopter 
that crashed was performing under a contract negotiated in Texas, the pilot 
flying the helicopter was trained in Texas, and the helicopters themselves 
were purchased in Texas.158  Justice Brennan asserted that these contacts 
were “directly related” to the alleged negligence in the plaintiffs’ wrongful 
death claims.159  Justice Brennan reasoned that limiting specific jurisdiction 
to suits that arise out of a nonresident defendant’s forum contacts would 
“subject constitutional standards . . . to the vagaries of the substantive law 
or pleading requirements of each State.”160  The Due Process Clause, Justice 
Brennan explained, “has never been so dependent upon the applicable sub-
stantive law or the State’s formal pleading requirements.”161  Justice Bren-
nan asserted that the narrow understanding of relatedness implied by the 
                                                          
 152.  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–16. 
 153.  Id. at 415 n.10 (quoting id. at 419–20 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 154.  Id. at 415 n.10 (majority opinion). 
 155.  Id. at 423–24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 156.  Id. at 424. 
 157.  Id. at 426–27. 
 158.  Id. at 425–26. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 427.  For example, Justice Brennan pointed out that the wrongful death claims 
brought by the plaintiffs alleged negligence based on pilot error.  Id.  If the substantive state law 
required proof of negligent training as an element of that claim, the plaintiffs’ cause of action 
would arise out of Helicol’s Texas contacts.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
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majority overlooked the expansion of personal jurisdiction under Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny.162 
Helicopteros was not the last time the Court shied away from inter-
preting the “arise out of or relate to” requirement.  In Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute,163 a plaintiff’s slip-and-fall on a Carnival cruise was lit-
igated in the state where Carnival had solicited the ill-fated vacationer.164  
In that case, the Court set aside the question of whether the slip-and-fall 
negligence cause of action arose out of or related to Carnival’s solicitation 
contacts in the state and, instead, rejected the forum’s adjudication of the 
dispute on the basis of a forum-selection clause printed on the plaintiff’s 
ticket.165  The Court stated, “Because we find the forum-selection clause to 
be dispositive of this question, we need not consider petitioner’s constitu-
tional argument as to personal jurisdiction.”166  Notwithstanding the “arise 
out of or relate to” requirement’s crucial function distinguishing specific ju-
risdiction from general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has seemingly gone 
out of its way to say very little of it, making it the least developed aspect of 
the minimum contacts doctrine. 
C.  Survey of “Arise out of or Relate to” Approaches in the Federal 
Circuits 
In the absence of guidance by the Supreme Court, with the exception 
of Justice Brennan’s dissent in Helicopteros,167 lower courts have taken it 
upon themselves to fashion the rules necessary to determine relatedness in 
the cases before them.168  Most circuits apply a tort-like, causation-focused 
                                                          
 162.  Id. at 422 (“The vast expansion of our national economy during the past several decades 
has provided the primary rationale for expanding the permissible reach of a State’s jurisdiction 
under the Due Process Clause.”); id. at 423 (“As active participants in interstate and foreign com-
merce take advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities offered by the various States, it 
is only fair and reasonable to subject them to the obligations that may be imposed by those juris-
dictions.”); id. (“[C]hief among the obligations that a nonresident corporation should expect to 
fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum that is significantly affected by the corporation’s com-
mercial activities.”). 
 163.  499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 164.  Id. at 588. 
 165.  Id. at 589. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text. 
 168.  The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, however, have not adopted any ap-
proach in particular for assessing relatedness.  See Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904, 
912–13 (8th Cir. 2012) (observing that the Eighth Circuit has not adopted an approach, but, rather, 
considers “the totality of the circumstances” in determining whether “the litigation ‘result[s] from 
injuries . . . relating to [the defendant’s] activities [in the forum state.]’” (first quoting K-V Pharm. 
Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 592–93 (8th Cir. 2011); and then quoting Steinbuch 
v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 586 (8th Cir. 2008))); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 
2010) (cataloging the circuit split on the relatedness issue and stating “[w]e have not weighed in 
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approach, requiring that a defendant’s forum contacts be a but-for cause of 
the plaintiff’s claim.169  Some of these circuits, while still requiring but-for 
causation, refuse to find relatedness if the but-for cause is too attenuated.170  
One circuit applies a “substantial connection” approach, requiring a defend-
ant’s contact with the forum to be substantially connected with the plain-
tiff’s claim.171  Finally, a few circuits have sometimes applied a “sliding 
scale approach” to adjust the measure of relatedness in appropriate circum-
stances where a court deems it fair in view of a defendant’s cumulative con-
tacts with the forum.172 
1.  The But-For Approach 
In Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines,173 prior to the Supreme Court de-
clining to address the relatedness question, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit employed a but-for test to determine whether 
Shute’s cause of action arose out of Carnival’s forum contacts.174  Similar to 
the law of torts, this test merely requires that but for a defendant’s forum 
contacts, the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred.175  In Shute, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that this relationship manifested because but for 
Carnival’s forum contact, selling the cruise ticket, Shute’s subsequent inju-
ry in a foreign jurisdiction while redeeming that ticket would not have oc-
curred.176  The Shute court explained that this approach “preserves the es-
sential distinction between general and specific jurisdiction” by preventing 
defendants from being “haled into court for activities unrelated to the cause 
of action” and by requiring “some nexus between the cause of action and 
the defendant’s activities in the forum.”177  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged 
that courts following the but-for approach could plausibly decide causes of 
action largely attenuated from a defendant’s forum contacts.178  In such in-
stances, the court proposed that the reasonableness prong of the jurisdic-
                                                          
on this conflict and need not do so here”); CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts of India, 
551 F.3d 285, 295 (4th Cir. 2009) (observing that the relatedness requirement was met using a 
vague “genesis” standard); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1078 
(10th Cir. 2008) (detailing the circuit split but ultimately stating “we have no need to pick sides 
today”). 
 169.  See infra Section II.C.1. 
 170.  See infra Section II.C.2. 
 171.  See infra Section II.C.3. 
 172.  See infra Section II.C.4. 
 173.  897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 174.  Id. at 385. 
 175.  Id. at 384 (summarizing the test as requiring that “[b]ut for [the defendant’s] contacts, the 
cause of action would never have come about”). 
 176.  Id. at 386. 
 177.  Id. at 385. 
 178.  Id.  
 880 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:862 
tional inquiry would trigger a due process violation and divest the court of 
jurisdiction.179 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has indicated 
preference for the but-for test without adopting it outright.  In Prejean v. 
Sonatrach, Inc.,180 the Fifth Circuit ordered further discovery as to the for-
mation of an employment contract in the forum so it could determine 
whether personal jurisdiction was properly exercised over a defendant with 
respect to wrongful death suits.181  The widowed plaintiffs alleged that their 
husbands’ employer had entered into a contract with the defendant corpora-
tion in the forum state.182  While performing under the alleged contract 
abroad, a plane carrying the plaintiffs’ husbands crashed.183  The Prejean 
court reasoned that if the employment contract existed, it was a but-for 
cause of the tort by virtue of it bringing the parties within “tortious ‘striking 
distance.’”184  This reasoning, however, is “arguably dicta,”185  and a more 
recent Fifth Circuit opinion has indicated preference for the but-for-plus ap-
proach without making an explicit adoption.186 
2.  The Substantive-Proximate Cause and But-For-Plus Approaches 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has resolved 
the problem of contacts being attenuated from the ultimate cause of action 
by following an approach that requires a more rigorous “proximate cause” 
tort analogy.187  This approach requires that the plaintiff’s claim be a direct-
ly foreseeable result of the defendant’s contact with the forum, making the 
defendant’s forum contact a substantive aspect of the plaintiff’s claim.188  In 
Marino v. Hyatt Corp.,189 for example, the plaintiff booked out-of-state ho-
                                                          
 179.  Id. (“If the connection between the defendant’s forum related activities is ‘too attenuat-
ed,’ the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, and therefore in violation of due process.” 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980))). 
 180.  652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). 
 181.  Id. at 1270–71. 
 182.  Id. at 1264. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 1270 n.21. 
 185.  Breathwit Marine Contractors, Ltd. v. Deloach Marine Servs., LLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 845, 
851–52 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 186.  See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 543–44 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (citing the Eleventh Circuit’s adherence to the but-for-plus approach approvingly and 
acknowledging that “this test is also satisfied”). 
 187.  See, e.g., Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(holding that injuries sustained at an out-of-state hotel did not arise from forum contacts com-
prised of newspaper advertisements). 
 188.  United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 
1089 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 189.  793 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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tel accommodations while in the forum and subsequently suffered injuries 
due to the proprietor’s negligence while at the hotel.190  The First Circuit 
held that although the plaintiff formed the contract in the forum, the negli-
gence which resulted in the plaintiff’s injuries while enjoying the accom-
modations was too far removed from the defendant’s forum contacts arrang-
ing the reservation.191  The court observed that the defendant’s forum 
contacts would “hardly be an important, or perhaps even a material, element 
of proof” in the plaintiff’s negligence cause of action.192 
The First Circuit developed the proximate cause test further in United 
Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. 163 Pleasant Street 
Corp.,193 stating that personal jurisdiction is rejected when the connection 
between the cause of action and the forum contact is attenuated and indi-
rect.194  Analogizing the concept of causation in tort law, the court required 
both cause in fact, that the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred but for 
the defendant’s forum activity, and legal causation, that the defendant’s fo-
rum activity “gave birth to the cause of action.”195  In the inquiry of legal 
causation, “foreseeability is critical.”196  The First Circuit has opined that 
since foreseeability is critical in evaluating the purposeful availment prong 
of the minimum contacts inquiry, it should also inform the relatedness 
prong, thus giving the defendant fair warning of their susceptibility to suit 
in a foreign jurisdiction.197 
In O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co.,198 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit found both the but-for and proximate cause 
approaches unappealing, instead opting for a middle ground looser than 
proximate causation but still closely tailored to the reciprocity principle 
conceived by International Shoe.199  The court acknowledged that the plain-
tiff, O’Connor, established but-for causation since he would not have been 
injured by Sandy Lane’s negligence in the course of spa treatments had 
Sandy Lane not made forum contacts soliciting him to make a reserva-
tion.200  In the Third Circuit’s view, however, a simple but-for standard was 
                                                          
 190.  Id. at 427. 
 191.  Id. at 430. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  960 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 194.  Id. at 1089. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 198.  496 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 199.  Id. at 323 (“The causal connection can be somewhat looser than the tort concept of prox-
imate causation, but it must nonetheless be intimate enough to keep the quid pro quo proportional 
and personal jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable.” (citation omitted)). 
 200.  Id. 
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too overinclusive to be the law of the circuit.201  The Third Circuit reasoned 
that “specific jurisdiction requires a closer and more direct causal connec-
tion.”202  Turning to the more restrictive test of the First Circuit, the court 
stressed that “relatedness analysis . . . requires neither proximate causation 
nor substantive relevance.”203  Later described as the “but-for-plus” ap-
proach,204 the court found sufficient relatedness between O’Connor’s claim 
and Sandy Lane’s forum contacts by recognizing the “meaningful link ex-
ist[ing] between [the] legal obligation that arose in the forum and the sub-
stance of the plaintiffs’ claims.”205  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit has also relied on an approach similar to the Third Cir-
cuit’s but-for-plus test, stating that “[n]ecessarily, the contact must be a 
‘but-for’ cause of the tort, yet the causal nexus between the tortious conduct 
and the purposeful contact must be such that the out-of-state resident will 
have ‘fair warning that a particular activity will subject [it] to the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign sovereign.’”206 
3.  The Substantial Connection Approach 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has adopted 
an approach that requires the cause of action to bear a substantial connec-
tion with the defendant’s forum contacts.207  In Third National Bank v. 
WEDGE Group Inc.,208 the Sixth Circuit applied a broad interpretation of its 
“substantial connection” requirement.209  In that case, Third National Bank 
in Nashville (“Third National”) sought to hold WEDGE Group, a nonresi-
dent defendant, liable for debts incurred by its subsidiary that operated out 
of the forum.210  The subsidiary’s debts arose from its default on a loan 
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agreement with Third National.211  WEDGE Group’s liability stemmed 
from a tax-sharing agreement it entered into with its subsidiary that was ex-
ecuted outside the forum state.212  Under the tax-sharing agreement, 
WEDGE Group was obligated to pay its subsidiary in the event of net oper-
ating losses.213  The Sixth Circuit noted that WEDGE Group entered into 
the tax-sharing agreement with an entity based in the forum and involved 
itself in negotiations to amend the loan agreement between its subsidiary 
and Third National.214  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that it was beside the 
point that the cause of action arguably arose out of the subsidiary’s default 
under its loan agreement with Third National because, even so, WEDGE 
Group’s forum contacts were substantially connected with the litigation, 
rendering WEDGE Group subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum.215 
The Sixth Circuit’s more recent decisions, however, have reframed its 
“substantial connection” approach, a test the Sixth Circuit has described as 
“lenient” in the past,216 as requiring proximate causation.  In Beydoun v. 
Wataniya Restaurants Holding, Q.S.C.,217 a Michigan resident, Nasser 
Beydoun, was approached by a Qatari corporation about taking on a posi-
tion as the corporation’s CEO.218  A representative of the corporation met 
with Beydoun in Michigan to discuss the terms and conditions of his em-
ployment.219  Beydoun ultimately accepted the position and moved to Qa-
tar.220  Beydoun lost a substantial amount of the corporation’s money during 
his tenure and was left stranded in Qatar when the corporation had his exit 
visa revoked pending litigation.221  Once the litigation was resolved in his 
favor, Beydoun was finally able to return to Michigan.222 
Beydoun filed a complaint against the corporation in Michigan alleg-
ing, among other things, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and mali-
cious prosecution.223  The Sixth Circuit rejected Beydoun’s assertion that 
the corporation’s Michigan contacts recruiting him and his numerous busi-
ness trips returning to Michigan on the corporation’s behalf had a substan-
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tial connection with the causes of action.224  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that 
“the plaintiff’s cause of action must be proximately caused by the defend-
ant’s contacts with the forum state” to satisfy the relatedness requirement.225  
Since Beydoun’s causes of action all arose in Qatar long after the corpora-
tion had recruited him and his subsequent business trips to Michigan were 
unrelated to the operative facts of the controversy, the Sixth Circuit held 
that Beydoun failed to establish that his causes of action were substantially 
connected with the corporation’s forum contacts.226 
4.  The Sliding Scale Approach 
The “sliding scale approach,” yet to gain much of a following outside 
of the Ninth and Second Circuits, is not a distinct approach in and of itself, 
but, rather, consists of one of the other approaches supplemented by a guid-
ing principle.227  The guiding principle allows a forum to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendants with respect to claims that are increasingly at-
tenuated from the defendant’s contacts as the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum become more and more significant.228  The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia applied the sliding scale approach in Bristol-Myers Squibb to estab-
lish a low threshold for relatedness under the substantial connection ap-
proach.229  Federal courts, however, have applied the sliding scale approach 
to determine the allowable level of attenuation that is appropriate for a giv-
en defendant under the but-for approach.230 
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In Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd.,231 the First Circuit briefly 
broke away from its precedent following the proximate cause approach and 
acknowledged that circumstances sometimes dictate loosening the rigid re-
strictiveness that approach entails.232  Citing the nonresident defendant’s 
successful, “ongoing effort to further a business relationship” in the forum, 
the court reasoned that the nexus between the defendant’s forum contacts 
soliciting guests for its hotel and the negligence cause of action regarding 
the death of one of those guests was “sufficiently strong to survive the due 
process inquiry at least at the relatedness stage.”233  The First Circuit de-
duced that such a departure was warranted by the jurisdictional inquiry’s 
need for flexibility, noting that “relatedness cannot merely be reduced to 
one tort concept for all circumstances.”234  While Nowak signaled that the 
First Circuit views claim relatedness broadly with respect to particular de-
fendants that have made significant forum contacts, the sliding scale ap-
proach simply operates with that broad understanding as a premise.  Courts 
adhering to the sliding scale approach assess the entirety of a defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state to derive a threshold of relatedness that is fair 
with respect to that particular defendant.235 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that a defendant’s relationship with a third party is not enough to connect a 
claim with a forum.236  The Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of California which reasoned that California had specific jurisdiction 
over the nonresidents’ claims by virtue of the fact that BMS’s nationwide 
sales of Plavix also gave rise to claims brought by California residents.237  
The Court held that California’s exercise of jurisdiction violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no “ade-
quate link” connecting the nonresidents’ claims with the forum.238  Since 
the plaintiffs at issue were not California residents, did not suffer harm in 
California, and the conduct giving rise to the claims happened elsewhere, 
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such a connection was severely lacking.239  The Court reasoned that BMS’s 
activities in California and the resident plaintiffs’ claims that arose out of 
those activities provided no basis for asserting specific jurisdiction over the 
nonresidents’ claims because “a defendant’s relationship with a . . . third 
party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”240 
Given that “restrictions on personal jurisdiction ‘are more than a guar-
antee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation’” but are also “a 
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States,” 
the fact that BMS would have to defend the suit against the resident plain-
tiffs was not conducive to the forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
BMS with respect to the claims brought by nonresidents.241  The Court con-
cluded that BMS’s amenability to the resident plaintiffs’ identical suits 
failed to satisfy specific jurisdiction’s requirement that the nonresidents’ 
suits bear some connection with the forum.242 
Finding the California Supreme Court’s sliding scale approach “diffi-
cult to square” with Supreme Court precedent, Justice Alito remarked that 
the approach resembles “a loose and spurious form of general jurisdic-
tion.”243  The danger of sliding scale, the Court explained, was illustrated by 
California’s exercise of specific jurisdiction on the faulty basis of a defend-
ant’s extensive forum contacts with third parties while overlooking the glar-
ing inadequacy of the connection between the nonresidents’ claims and the 
forum.244  When there is no connection between a claim and the forum, 
“specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s un-
connected activities in the State.”245 
The Court held that the plaintiffs had misinterpreted two cases relied 
on in support of California’s exercise of specific jurisdiction.246  First, in 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,247 the Court held that a plaintiff could re-
cover damages for libel printed in a magazine that was distributed across 
the country.248  The Court distinguished Keeton since its holding concerned 
the “scope of a claim involving in-state injury and injury to residents of the 
State” while the case at hand concerned entirely distinct claims “involving 
no in-state injury and no injury to residents of the forum State.”249  Second, 
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in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,250 the Court held that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident members of a class action did not vi-
olate due process.251  In that case, however, the defendant had argued that 
the exercise of jurisdiction violated the due process rights of the plain-
tiffs.252  The Court reasoned that since the case at hand concerned the due 
process rights of the defendant, an issue that was not argued in Shutts, the 
Court’s reasoning in Shutts was minimally relevant to the issues presented 
by BMS.253 
Justice Sotomayor dissented, finding that the California courts appro-
priately exercised specific jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ 
claims.254  Describing the core concern of personal jurisdiction as fairness, 
Justice Sotomayor reasoned that “there is nothing unfair about subjecting a 
massive corporation to suit in a State for a nationwide course of conduct 
that injures both forum residents and nonresidents alike.”255  Subscribing to 
a more expansive understanding of “relate to,” Justice Sotomayor found 
that since the claims were materially identical and arose out of the defend-
ant’s nationwide course of conduct, the requirements of specific jurisdiction 
had been met.256  Justice Sotomayor accused the majority of taking the rea-
soning of Walden v. Fiore out of context and inappropriately applying it to 
the “arise out of or relate to” requirement when it solely concerned purpose-
ful availment.257  Fearing a chilling effect on the ability to bring mass tort 
actions—specifically ones involving more than one defendant, as was the 
case here—Justice Sotomayor characterized the majority opinion as curtail-
ing the ability to hold corporations accountable for their nationwide con-
duct.258 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed California’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over claims brought by 
nonresident plaintiffs for out-of-state injuries arising out of conduct that oc-
curred entirely outside California.259  The Court held that California lacked 
specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims notwithstanding the fact 
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that the claims arose out of a nationwide course of conduct that also gave 
rise to claims brought by California residents.  The Court reasoned that Cal-
ifornia’s exercise of specific jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause 
because the defendant’s relationship with a third party is not enough to 
connect the nonresidents’ claims with the forum.260  The Court reached the 
correct result because asserting specific jurisdiction over claims so tenuous-
ly connected with the forum exploits an expansive understanding of “relate 
to” that is incompatible with the objectives of due process and long-
standing Supreme Court precedent.261  Although reaching the correct con-
clusion, the Court made a cursory evaluation of sliding scale relatedness, an 
approach employed by a number of lower courts for compelling reasons, 
and may have passed over the method of assessing relatedness that best 
comports with the minimum contacts doctrine’s fundamental purpose—
fairness.262 
A.  Asserting Specific Jurisdiction over a Claim on the Sole Basis of the 
Defendant’s Relationship with a Third Party Undermines the 
Objectives of Due Process and Conflicts with Precedent 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court foreclosed an expansion 
of the minimum contacts doctrine’s “arise out of or relate to” requirement 
which reasoned that a defendant’s relationship with a third party, by itself, 
is enough to connect a claim with a forum.263  While BMS’s nationwide 
course of similar conduct in the marketing of Plavix provided sufficient re-
latedness between the nonresidents’ claims and BMS’s forum contacts in 
the view of both the California Supreme Court264 and Justice Sotomayor,265 
the majority opinion honed in on the relationship between the nonresidents’ 
claims and the forum to the exclusion of BMS’s relationships with third 
parties.266  Setting those third-party relationships aside, the Court resolved 
that a connection between the nonresidents’ claims and the forum was 
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clearly lacking.267  In so holding, it follows that the minimum contacts doc-
trine’s relatedness inquiry cannot rely on a similarity relationship268 or the 
defendant’s course of conduct with respect to third parties in establishing a 
nexus between the forum and the litigation.  The Court aptly voided these 
interpretations since such an expansive reading of the words “relate to” 
would only serve as an obstacle to the Due Process Clause’s most funda-
mental functions while furnishing superficial compatibility with the mini-
mum contacts doctrine’s necessarily indeterminate wording.269 
Construing forum contacts as “related to” conduct that gives rise to a 
suit on the basis of a similarity relationship has long been met with skepti-
cism due to its expansiveness.270  Despite the lack of courts which have re-
lied on similarity relationships,271 Bristol-Myers Squibb presented a compel-
ling basis for a narrow adoption.  Under California’s “sliding scale 
approach,” requisite relatedness was at its nadir due to BMS’s extensive ac-
tivities in the forum.272  Additionally, BMS’s “single, coordinated, nation-
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wide course of conduct,” which was comprehensively “implemented by dis-
tributors and salespersons across the country,” seemed to provide a stronger 
basis for connecting the nonresidents’ claims with BMS’s forum con-
tacts.273 
The Court, however, rendered this line of reasoning invalid by noting 
that “a defendant’s relationship with a . . . third party, standing alone, is an 
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”274  By curbing BMS’s forum contacts 
with third parties, the Court indicated that neither similarity nor an exten-
sively coordinated general strategy is material to a relatedness inquiry be-
tween separate acts occurring within and without the forum state.275  A 
court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over claims brought by nonresi-
dents simply because resident plaintiffs were similarly harmed by the de-
fendant’s similar conduct.276  As to BMS’s course of conduct, the majority 
opinion’s analysis does not even mention it.277  While BMS’s course of 
conduct may seem to connect its California contacts with the nonresidents’ 
claims, from start to finish, BMS’s activities in California solely involve a 
relationship between BMS and third parties.278  Were it not for that relation-
ship, the nonresidents’ claims would have nothing to do with the forum 
state.279  Thus, when a relatedness inquiry relies on a similarity relationship 
or the defendant’s course of conduct, BMS’s relationship with a third party 
“stand[s] alone” as the basis for jurisdiction.280 
Although Justice Sotomayor attacked the majority for drawing reason-
ing which concerned purposeful availment from Walden v. Fiore,281 there 
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are few reasons not to look to Walden for guidance since its reasoning 
draws on the core principle that specific jurisdiction is centrally concerned 
with “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion.”282  Pertinently, this relationship does not include third parties.  As 
Walden explained, “[d]ue process limits on the State’s adjudicative authori-
ty principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant.”283  That lib-
erty interest is undermined when a defendant’s relationship with a third par-
ty is allowed to satisfy the relatedness requirement with respect to claims 
bearing no further connection with the forum state because the forum lacks 
a sovereign interest in regulating that conduct.284  Without a sovereign in-
terest, courts asserting jurisdiction under the expansive understanding of re-
latedness advanced by California would address wrongs that they have no 
interest to right and thereby impinge on the liberty interests of nonresident 
defendants.285 
Allowing a defendant’s relationship with a third party, by itself, to 
serve as the connection between a claim and a forum would undermine oth-
er fundamental tenets of due process as well.  Endorsing such an interpreta-
tion would contravene World-Wide Volkswagen by infusing the Due Pro-
cess Clause with a great degree of unpredictability.286  If the courts of each 
state where BMS sold Plavix interpreted “relate to” as expansively as Cali-
fornia, plaintiffs would have the choice of any state they like for proceeding 
against BMS.287  Plaintiffs exercising such wide-ranging freedom of choice 
in selecting a forum would thus upset the “orderly administration of the 
laws,” one of the central purposes of the Due Process Clause identified in 
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their injuries is implicated.” (citations omitted)). 
 285.  See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National 
Debate About “Class Action Fairness”, 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 1313, 1347 (2005) (“The defendant 
has a due process right to have states act only within the limits of their sovereignty.”); Brilmayer, 
supra note 268, at 85 (“[T]he sovereignty concept inherent in the Due Process Clause is not the 
reasonableness of the burden but the reasonableness of the particular State’s imposing it.”). 
 286.  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“The Due 
Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws,’ gives a degree of predictabil-
ity to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with 
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))). 
 287.  See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilib-
rium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 242 (2014) (observing that allowing a 
similarity relationship to satisfy the relatedness requirement “would give the plaintiff the choice of 
essentially every state for proceeding against a national corporation”). 
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International Shoe.288  This unpredictability is compounded by the potential 
for plaintiffs’ judgments to vary drastically in amount depending on which 
state they choose.289  Basing jurisdiction solely on a relationship between 
the defendant and a third party would also cause friction with International 
Shoe’s principle of reciprocity.290  Even if BMS sold a minimal amount of 
Plavix in the forum state, plaintiffs across the country could cluster their 
claims there by virtue of BMS’s relationship with third parties.291  What lit-
tle privilege BMS exercised in the forum state would produce much greater 
obligations and destroy specific jurisdiction’s tacit quid pro quo.292 
B.  Despite the Court’s Criticisms, the Sliding Scale Approach Remains 
a Viable, Compelling Method for Assessing the Requisite Threshold 
of Relatedness 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court of the United States re-
versed the California Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction which ap-
plied the sliding scale approach.293  While Justice Alito regarded the sliding 
scale approach as resembling “a loose and spurious form of general juris-
diction,”294 there is a sharp disconnect between the ends these concepts re-
spectively reach.  The defining characteristic of general jurisdiction is that it 
reaches claims unrelated to a defendant’s “substantial” and “continuous” 
forum contacts.295  The sliding scale approach only reaches claims related 
to a defendant’s forum contacts.296  Sliding scale’s mere consideration of 
unrelated forum contacts to determine the appropriate measure of related-
                                                          
 288.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. 
 289.  William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 602 
(1993). 
 290.  326 U.S. at 319 (observing that when “a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting 
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state,” and that “so 
far as . . . obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within that state, a procedure 
which requires the corporation to respond to suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, 
hardly be said to be undue”). 
 291.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 908 (Cal. 2016) (Werde-
gar, J., dissenting) (“[E]nforcing a meaningful relatedness requirement ensures some degree of 
reciprocity . . . the liabilities to which the defendant is exposed in the forum will tend to bear a 
relationship to the benefits it has sought in doing business there.”), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 292.  See id. 
 293.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017). 
 294.  Id. at 1781. 
 295.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 296.  See Richman, supra note 289, at 615 (noting that, under sliding scale, “a weaker connec-
tion between the claim and defendant’s contacts should be permissible” when forum contacts in-
crease—not a complete lack of connection altogether (emphasis added)). 
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ness fails to bridge this divide.297  It follows that sliding scale is not a 
“form” of general jurisdiction at all.298  It was an expansive reading of “re-
late to”—not the sliding scale approach—which allowed the courts below 
to reach claims unrelated to BMS’s forum contacts under the guise of a spe-
cific jurisdiction inquiry.299  In this sense, the Court appears to misdirect its 
aversion for sliding scale in general when the Court’s actual cause for con-
cern was the use of sliding scale to reach a dubiously low threshold of relat-
edness under an expansive reading of “relate to.”300  In so doing, the Court 
failed to recognize both the dilemma lower courts have faced in attempting 
to assess the requisite threshold of relatedness and the adeptly fair solution 
offered by the sliding scale approach.301 
Although it is true that the lower courts had “found that specific juris-
diction was present without identifying any adequate link between the State 
and the nonresidents’ claims,”302 this was not a fault of the sliding scale ap-
proach.  A finding of relatedness by virtue of a defendant’s relationships 
with third parties is not an indispensable facet of the sliding scale ap-
proach.303  The sliding scale approach adjusts the measure of relatedness in 
accordance with the quantity and quality of the defendant’s cumulative fo-
                                                          
 297.  See Lawrence W. Moore, The Relatedness Problem in Specific Jurisdiction, 37 IDAHO L. 
REV. 583, 601 (2001) (noting that, under the sliding scale approach, “the distinction between gen-
eral jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction is preserved”). 
 298.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct at 1781. 
 299.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 896 (Cal. 2016) (Werde-
gar, J., dissenting) (“[B]y reducing relatedness to mere similarity and joinder, the majority ex-
pands specific jurisdiction to the point that, for a large category of defendants, it becomes indis-
tinguishable from general jurisdiction.”), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 300.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 301.  See Moore, supra note 297, at 600–01 (noting that the sliding scale approach avoids the 
debate of which categorical approach governs the relatedness inquiry and “neatly shifts the bal-
ancing point” through “a judicially manageable standard”). 
 302.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 303.  Relatedness by virtue of a defendant’s relationship with a third party constitutes just one 
type of relatedness on a spectrum of endless variations.  See William M. Richman, Part I—
Casad’s Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, Part II—A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Be-
tween General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1328, 1340–41 (1984) (book review) 
(proposing several hypothetical variations of relatedness).  Professor Richman offers the following 
hypothetical as an example of one of the many types of relatedness: 
Suppose the defendant, an Illinois corporation, manufactures a nonprescription antacid 
tablet in Illinois.  Its plant, warehouse, central offices, and sales manager are all in Illi-
nois.  It ships its product into every state, including California, and obtains substantial 
revenue from its sales there.  Further, it has assigned five salesmen or detail men to the 
California territory; they call on doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies in California and so-
licit orders for the product.  The plaintiff, a California resident who has taken the medi-
cation for years, attends a convention in New York, where he purchases the impure or 
adulterated drug and is injured.  He sues the defendant in California. 
Id. at 1344. 
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rum contacts.304  By reasoning that “a defendant’s relationship with a . . . 
third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction,”305 the 
Court made clear that similarity relationships and a defendant’s course of 
conduct offer no measure of relatedness for the sliding scale approach to 
gauge.306  Removing these expansive interpretations from the spectrum of 
relatedness still leaves a vast expanse of relatedness “variations and grada-
tions . . . too numerous to catalogue.”307 
Within this spectrum of “variations and gradations,” as relatedness 
strays further from a direct causal relationship, maintenance of the suit in 
the forum becomes less reasonable.308  Nevertheless, the Court continues to 
employ broad language to describe the requisite threshold of relatedness.  In 
International Shoe, the Court required that the suit “arise out of or [be] 
connected with” the defendant’s contacts.309  In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the 
Court required “a connection” or an “adequate link.”310  This language re-
jects the notion that a direct causal connection is required in every case.311  
The relatedness requirement is framed broadly for good reason—claims that 
are not proximately caused by a defendant’s forum contacts may nonethe-
less implicate a state’s legitimate sovereign interest.312  Granted that the 
Court’s broad language sweeps up an immense amount of activity that can 
be said to, in some sense, “relate to” a claim, some methodology is required 
to ascertain whether or not a link is “adequate.”313  A defendant’s cumula-
                                                          
 304.  Id. at 1345 (“As the quantity and quality of the defendant’s forum contacts increase, a 
weaker connection between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is permissible . . . .”). 
 305.  Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (omission in original) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014)). 
 306.  See id. (observing that there is a complete lack of a connection between the nonresidents’ 
claims and the forum). 
 307.  Richman, supra note 303, at 1340. 
 308.  Compare Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (“If the con-
nection between the defendant’s forum related activities is ‘too attenuated,’ the exercise of juris-
diction would be unreasonable . . . .” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 299 (1980))), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), with Nowak v. Tak How 
Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Certainly, jurisdiction that is premised on a contact 
that is a legal cause of the injury underlying the controversy . . . is presumably reasonable . . . .”). 
 309.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 310.  137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
 311.  See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 653–54 
(1988) (“The Supreme Court did not limit the specific jurisdiction quid pro quo rationale in Inter-
national Shoe to claims ‘directly arising out of’ forum activities; it noted that due process would 
be satisfied ‘in most instances’ if the ‘obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities 
within the state.’” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319)). 
 312.  See, e.g., Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715–16. 
 313.  See Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”?  It’s Time 
for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 
CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 125–26 (2004) (“Many lower courts treat these [‘arise out of’ or ‘relate to’] 
alternative definitions as equally acceptable, and act as if they are free to choose between them 
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tive forum contacts provide a suitable metric for determining the adequacy 
of a link because the defendant’s contacts, related or not, bear upon the 
question of whether maintenance of the suit in the forum is reasonable and, 
by extension, whether or not the state’s vindication of its sovereign interest 
unduly impinges on the defendant’s liberty.314 
The aggregate of a defendant’s forum contacts alters the reasonable-
ness of jurisdiction in a number of ways.315  First, a state’s interest in adju-
dicating a dispute increases as a defendant makes more contacts with the 
forum state because greater numbers of forum residents come into contact 
with the defendant.316  The forum state has a greater interest in ensuring that 
its residents obtain convenient, effective relief and that the defendant is not 
rendered judgment proof by virtue of its amenability to suit solely in a dis-
tant forum.317  Second, it is less burdensome to require a nonresident to de-
fend suit in a forum if they have drawn a great deal of benefit from the fo-
rum state through significant contacts.318  For a nonresident defendant 
whose forum contacts are few and far between, the costs associated with de-
fending suit in a foreign jurisdiction may very well outweigh the benefits 
                                                          
without having to justify the choice.”); Maloney, supra note 270, at 1271 (“The ‘arise from or re-
late to’ requirement is the essence of specific personal jurisdiction because it defines the necessary 
relationship between the defendant and the forum state. . . .  [A] misapplication of ‘arise from or 
relate to’ is tantamount to a misapplication of due process.”). 
 314.  See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (observing that the 
“fair play and substantial justice” factors “sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of ju-
risdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required”); 
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994) (observing that “the rea-
sonableness prong of the due process inquiry evokes a sliding scale” wherein “an especially strong 
showing of reasonableness may serve to fortify a borderline showing of relatedness and purpose-
fulness”); Moore, supra note 297, at 599–600 (“[A] defendant’s contacts (both seeking benefits 
for the defendant and creating risks to others) in a state justify that state asserting jurisdiction over 
that defendant. . . .  [T]he contacts must outweigh the possible judgment and the costs of defend-
ing for the assertion of personal jurisdiction to be fair.”).  But see Brilmayer, supra note 268, at 88 
(construing related contacts and unrelated contacts as “independent threshold tests” wherein “a 
greater quantum of unrelated activity does not compensate for attenuated related contacts”). 
 315.  See Richman, supra note 303, at 1345 (noting that a defendant’s unrelated contacts factor 
into the determination of whether a forum’s exercise of specific jurisdiction is fair by highlighting 
“the defendant’s benefits from the forum, the foreseeability of forum litigation, lack of inconven-
ience, and the defendant’s initiation of the relationship with the forum”). 
 316.  See EMI Music Mex., S.A. de C.V. v. Rodriguez, 97 S.W.3d 847, 860 (Tex. App. 2003) 
(observing that the forum state has a substantial interest in adjudicating a case concerning a negli-
gent out-of-state car accident because the defendant travels to the forum state “six to eight times a 
year to meet musicians . . . [and] coordinate promotional events in Mexico”). 
 317.  See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (“When claims [a]re small or 
moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of bringing an action in a for-
eign forum—thus in effect making the company judgment proof.”). 
 318.  See Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715–16 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that 
contacts which constitute a but-for cause of a plaintiff’s injuries are enough to warrant departure 
from the proximate cause approach when a defendant “directly targets residents in an ongoing ef-
fort to further a business relationship, and achieves [that] purpose”). 
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derived, making litigation in the forum state more burdensome.319  Third, a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state tend to demonstrate the lack of a 
burden in being required to respond to suit in the forum.320  Fourth, it is 
more foreseeable that a nonresident defendant will be haled before a court 
in a state that the defendant has made significant contacts with.321  Last, a 
defendant’s significant contacts tend to show that the defendant initiated a 
deliberate relationship with the forum state.322 
In these ways the sliding scale approach looks to the defendant’s unre-
lated forum contacts while retaining specific jurisdiction’s focus on “the de-
fendant, the forum, and the litigation.”323  Granted that there is a forum con-
tact by the defendant connecting the forum with the litigation that is not a 
relationship solely between the defendant and a third party, the defendant’s 
relationship with third parties is not “standing alone” as the basis for juris-
diction.324  The lower courts in Bristol-Myers Squibb missed the mark in 
this regard by failing to identify BMS activity within the forum state that 
bore a connection with anyone other than third parties.325  Once those con-
tacts are properly relegated to determining a low threshold of relatedness—
not serving as the related contact itself—there is simply no act by BMS in 
the forum with respect to the nonresidents’ claims for sliding scale to 
gauge, even at that low standard.326  This total absence of a related contact 
made California’s assertion of specific jurisdiction improper because the 
                                                          
 319. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 287, at 237 (observing that a nonresident defendant 
with isolated and sporadic forum activities will suffer greater hardship through in-state litigation 
than a nonresident operating on a continuous and systematic basis); cf. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (noting the reciprocal give-and-take between a defendant deriving 
benefit from a state and the obligation of responding to suit in that state). 
 320.  See Benson v. Rosenthal, 116 F. Supp. 3d 702, 713 (E.D. La. 2015) (noting that the de-
fendant had traveled to the forum state on several occasions, which tended to show that he would 
not be unduly burdened by being required to travel to the forum to defend himself in litigation). 
 321.  See, e.g., Del Ponte v. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd., No. 07-CV-2360, 2008 WL 
169358, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008) (observing that the defendant could have reasonably an-
ticipated becoming a party in the forum’s courts because the defendant made substantial contacts 
with the forum state); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rea-
soning that the totality of the circumstances concerning a defendant’s connections with the forum 
state warranted a finding that the defendant should reasonably have anticipated being haled into 
court there). 
 322.  See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 
2002) (noting that there is nothing fundamentally unfair about requiring a firm to defend itself in 
the forum state when a dispute arises from its representation of a forum state client and the repre-
sentation developed in a market the firm had deliberately cultivated and voluntarily undertook). 
 323.  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (emphasis added). 
 324.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (noting 
that a defendant’s relationship with a third party may not “stand[] alone” as the basis for jurisdic-
tion (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014))). 
 325.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 326.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (observing that there is a total lack of a 
connection between the nonresidents’ claims and the forum). 
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forum had no interest in regulating conduct it was totally unconnected 
with.327 
While it is somewhat true that the sliding scale approach is “difficult to 
square” with Supreme Court precedent in the sense that it is a specific juris-
diction inquiry that considers a defendant’s unrelated contacts, those unre-
lated contacts bear on the fairness of requiring the defendant to respond to 
suit in the forum, which is, after all, the minimum contacts doctrine’s fun-
damental inquiry.328  Under the sliding scale approach, a finger is kept on 
the pulse of fairness by allowing the measure of relatedness to inure to the 
benefit of a defendant that has not made significant forum contacts.329  A 
defendant with limited forum contacts would be subject to suit in that forum 
only where the plaintiff’s injury is proximately caused by those contacts.330  
Conversely, where a defendant’s forum contacts are significant, a defendant 
is amenable to suit in the forum where the plaintiff’s injury is not proxi-
mately caused by the defendant’s claim-related forum contacts.331  Low 
measures of relatedness allow states to effectively vindicate their legitimate 
sovereign interests with respect to defendants that have made significant fo-
rum contacts such that it would not be undue to require defense of a suit 
with a borderline showing of relatedness in the forum.332  The fact that 
courts have followed this sliding scale approach for years indicates that the 
common law process can sort out the requisite thresholds of activity that 
warrant the varying levels of relatedness without unduly sacrificing effi-
                                                          
 327.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 899 (Cal. 2016) (Werde-
gar, J., dissenting) (“A mere resemblance . . . creates no sovereign interest in litigating those 
claims in a forum to which they have no substantial connection.”), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 328.  See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (noting that reasonable-
ness considerations “sometimes serve to establish . . . jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of mini-
mum contacts than would otherwise be required”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
319 (1945) (observing that when obligations arise out of or relate to a defendant’s forum contacts 
“a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue” (emphasis add-
ed)); Richman, supra note 289, at 613 (describing the pre-litigation contacts requirement as “a 
bright-line test” making the fairness requirement more concrete). 
 329.  See Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 207 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[T]he re-
latedness requirement . . . authorizes the court to take into account the strength (or weakness) of 
the plaintiff’s relatedness showing in passing upon the fundamental fairness of allowing the suit to 
proceed.”); see also Rose, supra note 271, at 1559 (“[A]ny restrictions on plaintiffs’ ability to se-
lect a forum will, by definition, force some plaintiffs to give up their optimum forum.  Such re-
strictions are basically a transfer of wealth from plaintiffs to defendants.”). 
 330.  Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“If a plaintiff can show that his chosen forum State has a sufficient interest in the liti-
gation (or sufficient contacts with the defendant), then the defendant who cannot show some real 
injury to a constitutionally protected interest should have no constitutional excuse not to appear.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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ciency in the name of fairness.333  Yet such a loose standard in close harmo-
ny with fairness met inexplicable disdain from the Court,334 which ultimate-
ly went on to echo the familiar yet imprecise language of International 
Shoe and evade the weighty question of precisely what standard governs the 
relatedness inquiry.335 
Staying true to the broad understanding of relatedness envisioned by 
International Shoe while also keeping to the minimum contacts doctrine’s 
theme of fairness requires some explication that does not narrow that broad 
understanding in all instances.336  If it is presumptively fair for a forum to 
exercise specific jurisdiction over a suit arising directly out of the defend-
ant’s forum contacts and less so with respect to a suit that is only “related 
to” the defendant’s contacts,337 fundamental fairness requires a means of as-
sessing when more relatedness is required before jurisdiction can be proper-
ly asserted.338  Apart from the California courts’ use of sliding scale to 
reach the dubious understanding of “relate to” that the Court resolved to be 
flatly deficient, it is unclear why sliding scale met such sharp disapprov-
al.339  These are two separate issues.  Adherence to the sliding scale ap-
proach would be a gain for the minimum contacts doctrine’s function of 
fairness while also not detracting from a defendant’s ability to “structure 
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that con-
duct will and will not render them liable to suit.”340  It should come as no 
shock to defendants that they have a greater spectrum of liability in states 
                                                          
 333.  See supra notes 227–230 and accompanying text. 
 334.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (“Our cases 
provide no support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general juris-
diction.”). 
 335.  See id. (“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum 
and the specific claims at issue.”). 
 336.  See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 287, at 243 (arguing that since Daimler circum-
scribed the scope of general jurisdiction, “courts need to be cognizant of the need to exercise spe-
cific jurisdiction over tenuously related contacts of those corporations conducting the quantity and 
quality of substantial in-state business” that used to suffice for general jurisdiction “[i]n order to 
achieve the ultimate due process goal of ‘fairness’” (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 
746, 768 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring))).  But see Rose, supra note 271, at 1586 (“Balancing 
tests . . . .  are not the proper approach to personal jurisdiction because the value of certainty and 
predictability outweighs the advantage of getting the ‘right’ answer in individual cases.”). 
 337.  See Condlin, supra note 313, at 127 (“Linguistically, if the Court meant to require only a 
‘related to’ relationship . . . there would have been no need for it to use the expression ‘arise out 
of’—‘arise out of’ is simply a lesser included category of ‘related to’—and presumably everything 
said in the opinion was intended to be given effect.”). 
 338.  See Richman, supra note 303, at 1346 (noting that “claim-relatedness . . . is simply an 
analytical tool—a convenient summary of some of the factors that make an exercise of jurisdiction 
fair or unfair”). 
 339.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (describing sliding scale as resembling “a 
loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction” that is “difficult to square” with precedent). 
 340.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
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where they have cultivated an extensive relationship.341  In sum, if the Court 
was interested in guiding courts in their task of picking out an “adequate 
link” from the vast expanse of contacts that can be said to be, in some 
sense, connected with a claim, the Court’s reproach of sliding scale for the 
fixable fault of sliding too far may have caused it to pass over the best 
means of doing so.342 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that California lacked specific jurisdiction over claims brought by nonresi-
dents for out-of-state injuries that arose out of the defendant’s entirely out-
of-state conduct.  The Court found that the nonresidents’ claims lacked a 
connection with the forum notwithstanding the fact that the defendant en-
gaged in a nationwide course of similar conduct, giving rise to claims 
brought by forum residents that were identical to the nonresidents’ claims.  
The Court reasoned that California’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over 
the nonresidents’ claims violated the Due Process Clause because a rela-
tionship between the defendant and a third party is not enough to establish a 
connection between the claims and the forum.343  The Court reached the 
correct result because asserting specific jurisdiction over claims so tenuous-
ly connected with the forum exploits an expansive understanding of “relate 
to” that is incompatible with the objectives of due process and long-
standing Supreme Court precedent.344  Although reaching the correct con-
clusion, the Court made a cursory evaluation of the sliding scale approach 
and may have passed over the method of assessing relatedness that best 
comports with fairness, the minimum contacts doctrine’s fundamental in-
quiry.345 
                                                          
 341.  See id. (holding that the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is that which 
can be attributed to the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state); C. Douglas 
Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of 
Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 635 (2006) 
(“[T]he relationship requirement . . . is calculated to place the defendant on notice of the scope of 
the risk that its conduct has created with respect to a particular jurisdiction.”); Moore, supra note 
297, at 601 (observing that sliding scale “neatly shifts the balance point depending on the close-
ness of the contacts to the claim” and arguing that “balancing is not an impossible task . . . it is 
certainly preferable to categorical approaches”).  But see Rose, supra note 271, at 1584 (“Each 
case would turn on its own particular facts and thus predictability, one of the major policy goals 
applicable to personal jurisdiction, would disappear.”). 
 342.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (observing that the courts below had failed 
to “identify[] any adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’ claims”). 
 343.  Id. at 1781–82. 
 344.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 345.  See supra Section IV.B. 
